Mediterranean Migrations: Regionalism versus Globalization by Baldwin-Edwards, Martin.
Abstract – This paper challenges the claim of globalisation as a cause of
immigration into Southern Europe and, on an empirical basis, identifies regional-
isation as being the primary issue, along with networked migratory patterns.
However, the changing patterns of immigration do present challenges to both state
and society. It is argued here that recent policy responses in Portugal, Italy and
Spain have been inconsistent and irrational – reflecting more the ‘securitisation’ of
migration than European reality. Earlier policy innovations are identified, by
country and date: most of these have now been abandoned. It is suggested that all
of Southern Europe has converged onto a statist, restrictionist model of immigra-
tion control that was formerly held only by Greece. The principal characteristics
of this model are outlined, along with a migration flowchart and indicative data
for migrant flows and sub-flows in Italy and Spain. In the final section, I try to
show that the needs of the economy cannot be predicted, immigration cannot be
controlled in the manner currently being enforced across Southern Europe, and
attempts to do so will damage rather than improve economic productivity and
growth. The concept of an accomodating immigration policy is advanced, whereby
the state tries to manage the needs of both employers and potential migrants. Six
guidelines for policy development are suggested – most of which have already
been successfully carried out in the European Union. These are the following:
migration in order to find a job; circular cross-border migration; EU level negoti-
ation of readmission agreements; the need for a variety of migration-for-employ-
ment schemes; legal residence should not depend upon continuity of employment;
and discreet legalisation will still be needed in Southern Europe.
Key  words : Southern  European  immigration  policies,  regionalisation,
globalisation.
Resumo – MIGRAÇÕES NO MEDITERRÂNEO: REGIONALISMOS VERSUS GLOBALIZAÇÃO.
Este artigo põe em causa a ideia de que a imigração para a Europa do Sul se deve
à globalização e, com base em fundamentos empíricos, aponta a regionalização,
juntamente com o funcionamento em rede dos sistemas migratórios, como as
causas fundamentais. Reconhece-se, porém, que as actuais transformações dos
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Finisterra, XXXIX, 77, 2004, pp. 9-20padrões  migratórios  colocam  alguns  desafios  bem  reais  aos  Estados  e  às
sociedades. Considera-se que as respostas por parte das autoridades políticas de
Portugal, Espanha e Itália têm sido inconsistentes e irracionais – traduzindo a
“securitização” da questão da imigração, mais do que a realidade europeia. São
identificados, por país e por data, alguns aspectos inovadores de anteriores polí-
ticas de imigração – a maioria dos quais foi entretanto abandonada. Sugere-se que
toda a Europa do Sul convergiu para um modelo de controle da imigração esta-
tista e restritivo, que era anteriormente apanágio exclusivo da Grécia. São apre-
sentadas as principais características deste modelo, juntamente com um mapa de
fluxos migratórios e dados indicativos relativos aos fluxos e sub-fluxos em Espanha
e Itália. Na última secção, procura-se demonstrar que é impossível prever as
necessidades da economia, que a imigração não pode ser controlada da forma em
que o tem sido nos diversos países da Europa do Sul e que as tentativas nesse
sentido terão um resultado prejudicial, e não benéfico, sobre a produtividade e o
crescimento económico. É sugerido o conceito de política de imigração acomo-
datícia como aquela em que o Estado procura satisfazer as necessidades tanto dos
empregadores como dos potenciais migrantes. São sugeridas seis linhas orienta-
doras para o desenvolvimento de políticas futuras – a maioria das quais foi já
implementada com sucesso no interior da União Europeia. São elas: migração em
busca de emprego; migrações circulares transfronteiriças; negociação dos acordos
de readmissão ao nível da UE; necessidade de uma diversidade de esquemas de
“migração laboral”; não dependência da autorização de residência em relação à
continuação do vínculo laboral; e continuação da necessidade de mecanismos
discretos de legalização na Europa do Sul.
Palavras-chave : Políticas de imigração, Europa do Sul, regionalização, glo-
balização.
Despite the grandiose claims of authors such as SASSEN (2000) and CASTLES
and DAVIDSON (2000), identifying globalisation as an explanation of migration
patterns, there has been little overall increase in global migration but rather,
changed patterns impacting on certain regions (TAPINOS, 2000). Traditionally,
migration into the Mediterranean has tended to focus on the North-South flows
within the Basin: recently, new flows have had to be accommodated whilst the
older type of flows continue. The argument contained in this paper is along the
following lines:
1) That new migrations have made the Mediterranean region more com-
plex and created new management problems – not only of migration,
but also of international relations. The nature of immigration into
Southern Europe is now a remarkable mix of nationalities and skill
levels, only some of which could be considered part of a globalisation
process;
2) That Southern European policies have lurched back and forth incoher-
ently, reflecting underlying ambiguities, confusion of policy objectives
with policy mechanisms, and an overall statist mentality inappropriate
to the situation. Much of policy formulation in the last two years seems
10 Martin Baldwin-Edwardsto have its inspiration in the US paranoia about terrorism: thus the
recent policy changes are more ideology-based than pragmatic solutions
to problems; 
3) That the latest policy outcomes across Southern Europe seem to have
converged onto a common model, which approximates the Greek case –
where little or no policy innovation has occurred in this area, and the
result has been far from successful. This common model seems to have
been  derived  partly  out  of  the  ‘security’  ideology,  and  partly  from
conformism with European/Schengen trends. However, the features of
this model seem likely only to promote illegal migration, to retard the
integration of long-term migrants, and to be very costly in both financial
and social terms;
4) Finally, a policy solution is outlined, which follows a now-conventional
view of the usual regulation of capitalist markets: that states cannot
control migration, they can only manage it. Thus, government policy
should accommodate market supply and demand relationships through
a new flexible arrangement, rather than the old statist work permit
approach. No state now has the capacity to predict labour market needs,
or to react quickly to them: therefore, more open border policies are
essential in the proper management of migration. Such a policy needs to
be located in a regional or global framework, as it cannot easily be nego-
tiated on bilateral bases.
In pursuing this argument, I have adopted the following structure for the
paper: first, a brief discussion of globalisation versus regionalisation, along with
evidence for the Southern European countries; secondly, an outline of the policy
approaches across Southern Europe in the last decade, and in particular their
previous innovations; thirdly, a common model is advanced, with an explana-
tory diagram; and, finally, I propose a framework of accommodating migration
policies, and some suggestions on how their successful negotiation and imple-
mentation might be achieved.
I. GLOBALISATION, REGIONALISATION OR NETWORKS?
The claims by globalisation proponents that increased migration flows are
the accompaniment to increased capital and information flows are hardly
sustained by empirical evidence: rather, it seems that Europe has been the
specific recipient of increased types of flows. Here, I present a tripartite cate-
gorisation of migration flows, devised to test the claims of globalisation theo-
rists. The three categories are:
1) Regional migratory movements, defined as adjacent or proximate source
and receiving countries, with no strong tradition of such flows. Such
migrations could be cross-border or pendular;
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ably temporary in nature (e.g. refugees or economic migrants);
3) Networked migration, defined as migratory movements following previous
patterns, e.g. through colonial ties, family migration, bilateral country
links, etc.
It will be noted that these migratory types are independent of legal form
and of the mechanism of the migration itself; rather, they tend to focus implic-
itly on the personal costs and ease of migration.
Generally across Europe, there is little evidence of globalisation except in
the case of the UK. Regionalisation, on the other hand, is a normal European
pattern, along with networked migration. Looking at the Southern European
countries, the following distribution of principal nationalities shown in Table 1
allows for some conclusions.
Table 1 – Dominant nationalities in Southern European countries, ranked.
Quadro 1 – Principais nacionalidades presentes nos países da Europa do Sul.
** All migrants covered by EC law. 
** Predominantly EU nationals but also including some 72,000 third country nationals.
SOURCE: Data from national statistical institutes. Portugal: PEIXOTO (2002); Spain: RAXEN (2002); Italy: ISMU (2002);
Greece: own calculations from national database (2001).
For Portugal, the dominant pattern is of networked migration, but with the
arrival of Ukrainians and some other Eastern Europeans in recent years – which
might be considered either global or regional migrations. For Spain, there is a
mix of regional (Morocco), networked (Peru, Ecuador, Colombia) and some
global (China) migrations. Italy has predominantly regional (Morocco, Albania,
Tunisia,  Senegal,  Romania)  but  also  some  global  (USA,  China)  and  some
Portugal Spain Italy Greece
Nationality
Ranked
Residence
permits 1999
Including permit
to stay  2001
Residence
permits 2001
Residence
permits 2000
Census 2001
EU regime * EU regime * EU regime ** Morocco Albania
Cape Verde Cape Verde Morocco Albania Bulgaria
Brazil Brazil Ecuador Romania Georgia
Angola Ukraine Colombia Philippines Romania
Guinea-Bissau Angola China China USA
USA Guinea-Bissau Peru USA Cyprus
Sao Tome USA Dominican Rep. Tunisia Russia
Mozambique Moldova Romania Senegal UK
12 Martin Baldwin-Edwardsnetworked (Philippines) migrations. For Greece, it is again regional domination
(Albania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania), with some networked (Cyprus, Russia)
and some limited global (USA, Pakistan) migrations.
Thus, for all except Portugal, the dominant migratory flows seem to be
regional, with significant but variable extents of networked migration, and rela-
tively little global migration. This indicates a complex picture, where a ‘one size
fits all’ policy is unlikely to be helpful.
II. POLICY APPROACHES
Although almost all European countries have undertaken regularisations
of illegal residents, in various ways and at different times, it is in Southern
Europe that this policy instrument is most important. In fact, so few immigrant
workers were recruited by legal means in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece,
that something around 80-90% of legally present Third Country National workers
are legal solely because of regularisation programmes. Moreover, the non-appli-
cation rate for Italy’s various legalisations is estimated at 20-60% (BRUCKER
et al., 2001: 16); in Spain, the non-renewal rate of immigrants legalised in 1992
was estimated at around 50% by 1995 when their two-year permits had expired
(MENDOZA, 2000: 7). In Greece, the ratio of legal to illegal workers, at any one
time, is estimated as varying between 1:3 and 1:6 (BALDWIN-EDWARDS, 2004).
Thus, the absence of legal labour recruitment in Southern Europe has resulted
in legalisation programmes constituting the principal policy mechanism; we
might also add that this policy failure has been an important part of the expan-
sion of the informal sector in these countries, staffed increasingly by illegal
immigrants (BALDWIN-EDWARDS and ARANGO, 1999).
Despite the variety, and limited success of innovative policy in Portugal,
Spain and Italy, all of those innovations have now been overturned. In particu-
lar, we should note the following:
• Multiple and flexible visa arrangements (Portugal, 2001 law)
• Stay permit – via a continuous legalisation process (Portugal, 2001 law;
Spain, law 4/2000)
• Sponsored migration for employment search (Italy, 1998 law)
• Duties of state agencies in dealing with applications, e.g. time frame,
grounds for refusal, etc. (Portugal, 2001 law; Spain, law 4/2000)
• The right to family reunification (Italy, 1998 law)
• Rights of illegal immigrants (Spain, law 4/2000)
Most of these have now been removed by subsequent legislation. Since the
September 11 terrorist attacks, Southern Europe has become obsessed with a
security paradigm that has little to do with the European reality (BIGO, 2002).
The one Southern European country that has attempted no innovative policies,
Mediterranean Migrations: Regionalisms versus Globalisation 13and actually failed to maintain even a semblance of order in managing its immi-
grant population, is Greece. The lack of legal channels for entry, now well estab-
lished as a principal cause of illegal immigration across Europe (SCANLAN,
2002), was accompanied by poor border and internal controls, and no legalisa-
tion programme until 1997. The situation remains highly unsatisfactory even
today, with the threat of mass deportations – despite the opinion of the Ombuds-
man that these may be illegal – and immigrants left in limbo, between legality
and illegality.
Thus, it seems somewhat strange that the rest of Southern Europe should
have adopted a model of immigration that broadly resembles the Greek one.
The model emphasises the integrity of national borders, places severe restric-
tions on the number (quota) of immigrants potentially to be admitted, requires
employment contracts before entry, gives out mainly short-term permits, and
increasingly undercuts any rights which immigrants might have in law. This
model also is increasingly reliant upon expulsions without legal process, in
order to solve the problem of illegal residents. Until now, Greece has been the
only EU country that regularly expelled large numbers – typically 150-270,000
expulsions per year.
Below, I identify the main characteristics of contemporary immigration
control in Southern Europe.
Characteristics of the new Southern European immigration policies
If we consider how this immigration policy model operates, in terms of
flows, the following diagram (Fig. 1) proves useful. In Figure 1, I try to show
how migration flows interact with the formal and informal economy of the host
• Pre-entry authorisation in foreign consulate with guaranteed job (under quota set by the
Labour Ministry)
• Short permits (1 or 2 years)
• Continuous employment needed to renew permits
• Reduction or removal of many legal rights (e.g. in Spain, new law requires judges to expel
immigrants charged, not convicted, with a crime carrying a prison sentence; also in Spain,
expulsion of immigrants with permit applications; in Italy, expulsion of applicants for legali-
sation if their applications were not accepted)
• Aggressive police and other measures to detect illegal immigrants (in Spain, use of airline data
on  unused  return  tickets;  Spanish  deal  with  IOM  to  involve  NGOs  in  reporting  illegal
migrants), along with attempts to expel more migrants
• More secure borders, new technology, more helicopters, personnel and training. Also coast-
guard patrols (Spain, Portugal, Italy   and UK) – failed and expensive. Costs very high, e.g.
Greece spent ¤600m in 2002 on border measures.
• More readmission agreements with sending countries, and very recent attempts to make
sending countries construct an emigration policy, preventing departures.
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labour, and in some cases as beneficiaries of family reunification; asylum seek-
ers are generally denied the right to work, but in any case are very small
numbers in Southern Europe. The principal source of black economy workers
is provided by the very large flows of tourists (along with ‘students’, in much
smaller numbers). Thus, overstayers and others illegally working constitute the
greater part of the immigrant black economy participation. Illegal migration
itself seems to be important with two regional migrant groups – Albanians and
Moroccans – who are more likely to have entered without a visa. Only in the
case of Greece, where Albanians constitute some 65% of non-EU immigrants, is
the illegal migration route a normal pattern of labour market incorporation.
Fig. 1 – The new Southern European immigration policy.
Fig. 1 – A nova política de imigração na Europa do Sul.
There are a limited number of policy options for the state’s response to illegal
migrants in its economy. These are:
• Toleration of their illegal presence and employment;
• Attempts to coerce them into legality; and
• Expulsion from the territory.
In practice, every country uses a combination of all three instruments, but
with rather different emphases. Greece has been the outlier, with expulsion and
toleration uneasily co-existing as the main policy, although since 1997 some
legalisation attempts have been made. Spain, Portugal and Italy have relied
rest of
the world
immigration country
informal economy
permit renewal
procedures
legalisation procedures
formal
economy
expulsions
Illegal migrants
tourists+students
Labour recruitment
family members
asylum seekers
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2 For a detailed analysis of this, see JAHN and STRAUBHAAR (1999).
Mediterranean Migrations: Regionalisms versus Globalisation 15more upon a mix of legalisation and toleration; more recently, they have been
trying to develop expulsion as a serious option.
In Figure 2, these policy options are shown in a cyclical pattern, which I
believe to more accurately represent reality. Legalisation attempts have a short-
term effect, because all southern countries favour short-term statuses; the
requirements laid down for renewal of permits – continuous employment,
complete social insurance contribution records, various other bureaucratic
demands – along with bureaucratic ineptitude in processing applications, push
the legalised migrants rapidly back into illegality. This is represented by the
circular arrows in the left-hand box.
Migration flows also have something of this cyclical pattern, if expulsions
and deportations are used significantly. Thus far, only Greece has exhibited this
aspect of the model, but other southern countries are attempting to emulate it.
1. Empirical data in the flowchart
The strongest single piece of evidence has been revealed only recently by
the Spanish government (MNS, Aug. 2003). Using annual data of arrivals and
departures of non-residents, by nationality, they conclude that in 2002 some
460,000 South Americans did not leave Spain, and some 680,000 Africans
remained illegally. If correct, these data show conclusively that legal entry is the
normal pattern of illegal migration. However, the figures given for visas granted
over one year are absurdly high (18 million!) and at odds with data obtained for
the previous year. Below, I give some approximate data for Italy and Spain,
2001-2002, which demonstrate the continuing informality of labour recruit-
ment, migration flows, and labour market participation. They also suggest the
circularity of the legalisation processes, and the consequences of restrictive
granting of permits.
Table 2 – Statistical data for migrant flows/processes in Italy and Spain, 2001-2002
Quadro 2 – Dados estatísticos relativos aos fluxos/processos migratórios
em Espanha e Itália, 2001-2002
SOURCES: MNS (various dates); ICMPD (2003); STATEWATCH (2002); SCIORTINO and PASTORE (2002).
Italy Spain
INFLOWS
Total visas 1,000,000 670,000
Tourism or study n/a 150,000
Recruited labour 065,000 013,000
Illegal entry detected 031,000 016,000
OUTFLOWS
Expulsion orders 058,000 022,000
Orders enforced 021,000 3000
ILLEGAL STATUS
Regularisation applicants (latest data) 700,000 615,000
Permit renewal applicants n/a 335,000
Estimated no. undocumented 800,000 460,000
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The dominant mode of immigration management, i.e. pre-entry authorisa-
tion through employment, or through labour quota agreements, have been
shown to be ineffective and unable to respond to market demands – either from
employers or migrants looking for work. The state is unable to predict labour
market needs, owing to information deficit, a rapidly changing economic environ-
ment, and slow, inefficient bureaucratic processes. In reality, the informal sector
exists largely because of the labour market control mechanisms of Southern
European state systems. Two recent problems stand out as being indicative: in
Spain, the recruitment quota was set too high (apparently because they forgot
that recently legalised immigrants were more likely to fill vacancies); in Italy,
pensioners demonstrated against Berlusconi’s immigration restrictions, as they
needed to employ immigrants for elderly care and other domestic services.
Thus, Italy now has the biggest legalisation ever undertaken in Europe, with
700,000 applicants.
Bilateral agreements to return illegal migrants have proven less than effec-
tive, especially as the EU has to date not concluded any readmission agreements
with a significant sending country. More recent attempts to coerce, even pay,
sending and transit countries to control emigration seem to be more successful:
however, the implications of this have not been talked through. One of the
fundamental policies of the former Communist bloc was the prevention of
emigration by their nationals, by means of the ‘Iron Curtain’: is this now
Europe’s own policy, to recreate an Iron Curtain with neighbouring countries?
For Bhagwati, it is evident that “borders are beyond control and little can
be done to really cut down on immigration” (2003: 99,104). He also adds that
governments  should  reorient  their  policies  from  trying  to  stop  migration
towards coping with it. To this we might add, that given the neo-liberal emphasis
on market forces with movement of capital and goods, in the context of stagnant
European economies and market rigidities, relatively free movement of workers
is likely to assist Europe’s economic recovery. Protectionism has been success-
ful only as a short-term policy for long-term objectives: this hardly seems true of
immigration restrictions. Thus a radical shift is needed in the management of
immigration – away from the security and control paradigm of right-wing politi-
cians and towards economic development in both the first and third worlds.
I make some preliminary suggestions below.
The following broad outline of policy is suggested here:
1) Abandonment of labour recruitment, except for skilled professionals
and seasonal unskilled workers. The unskilled sector, which is the major
part of immigration into Southern Europe, is currently being filled by
illegal migrants. The state can neither predict, demand, nor respond
rapidly to it, therefore it should adopt an accommodating policy. This is
most easily achieved by allowing migration for job seeking, within
certain conditions;
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that temporary workers and seasonal workers can look for employment,
and return to their home country if they fail to find such (circular migra-
tion). The current policies force migrants to stay longer in the receiving
country, and may actually create permanent migrants owing to the diffi-
culty of return even to nearby countries;
3) The negotiation of agreements should not be done at a national level.
The negotiating power at this level is too weak, and it requires a regional
collaborative agreement to satisfy all parties. The asymmetrical struc-
tures set up by the EU have seriously damaged intra-Mediterranean rela-
tions, and the Barcelona Process has offered almost nothing to North
Africa. The Berne Process, which was started in 2001, looked to be a
serious attempt to consider new international regulation of migratory
movements;
4) There  should  be  a  variety  of  migration-for-employment  schemes,
enabling individuals and employers to choose the most appropriate. The
primary consideration should be of employers’ needs, whilst recognising
international and domestic legislation of workers’ and migrants’ rights;
5) Legality should not be contingent upon continuous employment, which
is an unrealistic aim even for the native workers in modern labour
markets. Rather, it should be linked to objective criteria of job search
and time limits on such; and
6) Illegal migrants and workers will still continue, not least because of the
large informal economies in Southern Europe. Concealed legalisations
(the “Contingente” in Spain) have proven far more effective in managing
the problem, as they do not attract subsequent illegal migrants through
the publicity. Proper policy management should hardly be visible, instead
of the regular fiascos that are observed across the region. However, the
fight against trafficking is now a serious issue, largely caused by poor
policy in the last twenty years. Legal routes to migration will cause the
most damage to traffickers, and begin to rectify the balance needed for
a rational and humane approach to migration.
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